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ABSTRACT  
This paper uses phenomenon based research to examine why all western internet firms (WIFs) 
have failed in China.  In contrast to western firms from other sectors which have all achieved 
different levels of success in China, no WIFs, from search engines, internet content providers, 
social networks, to e-commerce and sharing economy platforms, have been able to beat their 
Chinese competitors and achieve sustainable operational success in China.  Government 
censorship and control and cultural differences between China and the West are often cited as 
the main reasons for such failures, but similar conditions existed in other countries, such as 
Indonesia, Thailand or Saudi Arabia, which did not prevent WIFs such as Google from 
dominating over 90% of their search markets.  Existing international business theory, the 
Ownership-Location-Internalisation (OLI) Eclectic Paradigm, failed to offer plausible 
explanations.  Using comprehensive empirical evidence gathered from two rounds of elite 
interviewing, this paper identifies the key factors and the prevailing narratives from both the 
inside view and outside view to explain why all WIFs have failed in China.  The theoretical and 
managerial implications are discussed.  Future research should examine the key factors that led 
to the systematic failure of WIFs in China, particularly by testing propositions and developing 
new theoretical frameworks.  The lessons from this research will shed light on our understanding 
of globalisation strategies in rapid changing industries, with potential implications for general 
management theories in the digital age.  
 
Key words: Western Internet Firm (WIF), Chinese Internet Firm (CIF), Digital Firm, China, 
International Business, Multinational, Competitive Advantage, Failure 
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INTRODUCTION 
One peculiar phenomenon is that no western internet firms (WIFs)
1
, from Google, Amazon, 
eBay to Uber, have been able to beat their Chinese competitors and achieve sustainable 
operational success in China.  This is in sharp contrast to western firms from other sectors, 
including automotive, home electronics, fast moving consumer goods and professional services, 
all of which have achieved different levels of success in China (Guo & Gallo, 2017; Woetzel et 
al, 2015).  Strict government censorship and control and cultural differences between China and 
the West are often cited as the main reasons for their failure.  However, similar conditions 
existed in countries like Indonesia or Saudi Arabia, which did not prevent WIFs such as Google 
from dominating over 90% of their search market. 
This paper uses phenomenon based research (PBR) to explore the systematic failure of 
WIFs in China (van de Ven, 2016; Schwarz & Stensaker, 2016; Corley & Gioia, 2011).  
Empirical data was collected via two rounds of elite interviewing (Dexter, 1970; 2006; Ostrander, 
1993), supplemented by secondary data from published news, reports, and commentaries.  The 
interviews were conducted over two phases with two different groups of elites in order to 
compare and integrate the inside view and outside view on the phenomenon (Morris, et al, 1999; 
Mauboussin, 2009; Headland, Pike & Harris, 1990; Pike, 1954; Harris, 1964).  The first phase 
involved semi-structured interviews with 40 current and former senior executives from six WIFs 
in China and six of their Chinese competitors.  They were aimed at the inside view of the 
phenomenon from the emic perspective of senior executives from these firms.  The second phase 
involved unstructured, informal interviews during 37 social gatherings with 185 business, 
                                                          
1
 This paper focuses on western internet firms (WIFs), also known as digital firms, which from inception focus on 
digital services enabled by the Internet and related technologies including mobile.  These firms were born digital, 
particularly the so-called dot.com and e-Commerce firms, such as search engines, online content providers and retail 
platforms.  Typical examples include Google, eBay and Amazon.  It does not include traditional IT firms, such as 
Microsoft, Intel or IBM, which rely on sales of hardware and software as their main sources of revenue.  
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governmental and professional elites, all with extensive knowledge of China.  They were aimed 
at the outside view from the etic perspective of observers with diverse social and professional 
backgrounds.  By comparing and integrating the inside and outside views, this paper goes 
beyond existing international business theory - the OLI (Ownership-Location-Internalisation) 
eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1977; Narula, 2006), and speculative reasons highlighted by past 
research (e.g. Wang & Ren, 2012), to explain why all WIFs have failed in China.   
This research found that the reasons for the systematic failure of WIFs in China are 
complex.  WIFs brought few genuine, sustainable competitive advantages while 
comprehensively underperformed their Chinese competitors in nearly every aspect.  The 
prevailing narrative emerging from the inside view is the lack of strategic determination and 
patients by WIFs in China, but the outside view emphasised the failure by WIFs to acclimatise to 
China‟s business environment as the most crucial factor for their failure.  
More specifically, the inside view identified seven key themes, including poor 
understanding of the Chinese market; failure to manage China‟s regulatory environment, 
infrastructure and government relation; imposing global business models in China; failure to 
cope with extreme competition; problems with business partners and local acquisitions; imposing 
global technological platform in China; and centralised organisational structures and slow 
decision making.  While these factors undoubtedly contributed to the failure of WIFs in China, 
the generic nature of these factors suggests that the insiders perhaps have focused mainly on the 
familiar reasons that most foreign firms from any sectors would give for their failure in China.   
The outside view identified six themes, including the large number of local competitors; 
the extreme aggression and strong determination by local competitors; fundamental differences 
between internet services and other industries; the failure by WIFs to develop and communicate 
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strategies effectively; ineffective innovation strategy; and failure to be embedded in China.  
Interestingly, the outside view not only confirmed some familiar themes identified by the inside 
view, but also identified three new themes; and the inside view and outside view have converged 
in the aggregate dimensions around business environment, strategy and execution.   
In the next section, the phenomenon is illustrated.  Then the research design is discussed, 
followed by the main findings from the semi-structured interviews with senior executives from 
six WIFs and their Chinese competitors; and the insights emerging from the unstructured 
interviews with 185 business, political and professional elites from diverse backgrounds.  The 
prevailing narratives for the systematic failure of WIFs in China and their theoretical and 
managerial implications are discussed; and new directions for future research are highlighted.   
 
THE PHENOMENON  
So far, all WIFs, including digital heavy weights such as Google, eBay and Amazon, have 
failed operationally in China.  Yahoo was the first WIF to enter China in 1998.  Despite its early 
successes, its market share declined rapidly due to strong competition from Chinese competitors, 
Sohu, Sina and Netease.  Yahoo China handed over control to Alibaba in 2005, but the decline 
continued and it was eventually shut down in September 2013.
2
   
Yahoo was not an isolated case, and similar failures were observed in every major WIF in 
China.  eBay entered China in 2002, but despite its early dominance, its market share declined 
rapidly from over 80% to a mere 6.2% by the time of its exit in 2006, due to strong competition 
from Alibaba‟s Taobao.  Google entered China in 2006, but its market share in China only 
peaked at 33%, declining to 19.3% against Baidu‟s 63% by the time of its exit in 2010.  Amazon 
                                                          
2
 Yahoo failed operationally in China despite the significant financial return from its investment in Alibaba.  Yahoo 
handed over its operation and invested $1bn to take a 40% stake in Alibaba in 2005.  It earned $9.4 billion from 
Alibaba‟s IPO in 2014, and still holds 383 million (15%) of Alibaba shares (held in Altaba).   
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and Groupon are still operational in China, but both are marginal players with single digit market 
shares.  Compared with the success achieved by western firms from other sectors in China, we 
have never witnessed such systematic failure before.  Neither have WIFs failed so systematically 
in any other international market around the world.   
Uber‟s surrender to DiDi Chuxing in 2016 was particularly puzzling.  It set up a highly 
autonomous Chinese subsidiary; partnered with China‟s largest search engine Baidu; committed 
significant capital and paid out $2billion in subsidies to win market share; and offered services 
tailored for the Chinese market.  Uber founder and then global CEO, Travis Kalanick, spent over 
20% of his time in China.  It was hard to pinpoint anything Uber did wrong but it still failed.
3
   
The systematic failure of WIFs in China is in stark contrast to the success by western firms 
in other sectors.  In sectors where scale economies are critical, such as car manufacturing, 
Volkswagen was the first western firm to set up a joint venture in 1985.  By 1995 it dominated 
over 70% of Chinese car market (Li & Li, 1999).  Although its market share declined to under 15% 
it sold over 3 million cars in China in 2016, nearly one third of its global sales of 10.3 million.
4
  
In 2016, foreign car brands accounted for nearly 60% of the market share in China, compared to 
40% by domestic brands.
5
  In the luxury car segment, Audi, BMW and Mercedes control over 80% 
of the Chinese market.  In sectors where culture plays a key role, such as beer, coffee shops, fast 
food and the film industry, western firms have also achieved different levels of success in China.  
Interestingly, mass-market western brands often enter China by positioning themselves as high-
end, or at least, prestige names.  So far, this strategy has worked well.  Starbucks has opened 
over 3000 coffee shops in 130 cities in China.  Its outlets are seen as an upmarket destination, 
                                                          
3
 Uber spent $2bn to win 8% market share in China.  When it was taken over by Didi Chuxing in 2016, Uber took a 
20% stake (worth $7bn) in the combined company.  Despite the lucrative return, Uber failed operationally in China.   
4
 Volkswagen. http://carsalesbase.com/china-car-sales-data/volkswagen/ 
5
 China car sales analysis 2016  http://carsalesbase.com/china-car-sales-analysis-2016/ 
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charging more for a coffee than in the US.
6
  KFC, McDonald‟s and Subway are all amongst the 
top 10 fast food chains in China.  AB InBev, the beer conglomerate, increased its market share 
from 11% in 2002 to 15.7% in 2015.
7
  In the first half of 2017, six of the top ten films in China 
were from Hollywood, all debuted bigger and generated more revenue in China than in North 
America.
8
  Despite growing competition from Chinese competitors, western firms from other 
sectors have managed to succeed in China.  So why have all WIFs failed in China?  
 
THE RESEARCH DESIGN  
Whilst the failure of WIFs in China is subject to much speculation and debate, systematic 
studies are rare.  Commonly cited reasons include strict government censorship and control, poor 
understanding of Chinese culture and market, and insufficient local autonomy (e.g. Wang & Ren, 
2012; Zeng & Glaister, 2016, Woetzel et al, 2017).  However, these factors did not prevent WIFs 
succeeding in other heavily regulated and culturally different markets in Asia, the Middle East or 
Africa; or stop western firms from other sectors succeeding in China (Park & Vanhonacker, 2007; 
Li & Li, 1999).  The internet market is a culture market with strong network effect.  Although 
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Thailand are culturally different, they are perhaps too small 
to sustain their own native internet firms.  However, Google‟s success in India (94.53%), Brazil 
(95.07%), Japan (65.43%) and Russia (42.9%), compared to 1.55% in China in 2017, suggests 
that while these factors have played a role, they could not explain why all WIFs have failed.   
 
Phenomenon Based Research (PBR) through Elite Interviewing 
                                                          
6
 Starbucks makes super-sized China bet as it looks beyond US. The Financial Times, https://goo.gl/7RL8x8  
7
 These are China's biggest beer brands. http://fortune.com/2017/03/16/china-biggest-beer-brands/  
8
 China box office mid-year report: Transparency concerns, franchise fatigue and the biggest film ever. 
https://www.screendaily.com/features/china-box-office-2017-mid-year-report-/5120767.article 
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This paper uses PBR to examine the systematic failure of WIFs in China (Schwarz & 
Stensaker, 2016; van de Ven, 2016).  Different from theory based research (TBR), PBR focuses 
on capturing, documenting, and conceptualising an observed phenomenon in order to facilitate 
knowledge creation and advancement (Schwarz & Stensaker, 2014; van de Ven, 2016).  Krogh, 
Rossi-Lamastra & Haefliger (2012) define a phenomenon as regularities that are unexpected, 
challenge existing theory and are relevant to scientific discourse. It tackles problems that are 
relevant to management practice but fall outside the scope of available theories.  Thus, the aim of 
PBR is to capture, describe, document and conceptualise a phenomenon so that appropriate 
theorising and the development of research designs can proceed.  Although mainstream 
management literature is dominated by TBR (van de Ven, 2016; Corley & Gioia, 2011), too 
strong a focus on theory can „prevent the reporting of rich details about interesting phenomena 
for which no theory yet exists‟ (Hambrick, 2007:1346).   
Initially, the OLI eclectic paradigm from existing international business theory (Dunning, 
1977, 1980, 1995, 2001; Cantwell et al, 2010; Narula, 2006; Collinson & Rugman, 2007) was 
used to identify the reasons for the failure of WIFs in China through inductive case studies.  
However, it soon became apparent after the first few interviews that this approach would not 
work.  While each case study can reveal explicit reasons for its failure, the OLI eclectic paradigm 
could not convincingly explain why all WIFs have failed.  The perceived competitive advantages 
for WIFs linked to OLI are not fundamentally different from western firms from other sectors in 
China.  Yet only WIFs failed while western firms from most other sectors succeeded.   
Data collection was via „elite interviewing‟ (Dexter, 1970; 2006; Ostrander, 1993; Parry, 
1998; McDowell, 1998; Harvey, 2010; Berry, 2002), also referred to as „expert interviewing‟ 
(Dogner, Littig & Menz, 2009), although the former emphasises the power and influence while 
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the latter stresses the knowledge and expertise of the interviewees.  This method has been widely 
used in social sciences to understand the perspectives of leaders in business, government and 
society (Dexter, 1970; 2006; Dogner, Littig & Menz, 2009; Harvey, 2010).  In this paper, elites 
are defined broadly, with both power and knowledge emphasised, including ultra elites who hold 
significant power and influence over people and organisations (Zuckerman, 1972; Stephens, 
2007); professional elites who possess substantial knowledge and expertise (McDowell, 1998); 
leaders of organisations and institutions; and people with important social networks, social 
capital and strategic positions within social structures (Conti & O‟Neil, 2007; Burt, 1992; Parry, 
1998).  The main strength of elite interviewing is the stress it places on the interviewee‟s 
definition of the situation, and encourages them to structure the account of the situation and 
focus on what they regard as relevant.  It is particularly effective in identifying factors outside 
the boundary of existing theories, or offering alternative views on known factors.   
 
The First Phase: Semi-Structured Interviews with Senior Executives from Internet Firms 
The first phase comprises semi-structured interviews with 40 senior executives from six 
WIFs in China, namely Yahoo, eBay, Google, Amazon, Groupon and Uber, and six Chinese 
internet firms (CIFs) that are deemed their direct competitors, namely, Sohu, Taobao, Baidu, 
JD.com, Meituan and Didi Chuxing (Table 1).  These executives were selected to cover different 
types of internet firms, but it was partly dictated by access, mostly through introductions by 
mutual friends (Chua, Morris & Ingram, 2009).  As Google, eBay and Yahoo no longer had 
subsidiaries in China, former senior executives were interviewed.  All 40 interviewees were 
Directors and Senior Managers, usually one level subordinate to the CEO.  Most interviews were 
conducted between April 2012 and May 2013, with Uber and Didi Chuxing in September 2016.   
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----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
Each interview began with a brief explanation of the purpose of the research followed by 
questions, typically lasting 90 to120 minutes.  A semi-structured protocol was adopted, and 
participants were encouraged to provide examples and context (Lee, 1999).  Interviews were not 
recorded on the advice of some interviewees during the initial stages, due to the sensitive nature 
of some questions, but written notes were taken and were written up soon afterwards (Barkema 
et al, 2015).  Secondary data was collected from published news and reports (Eisendardt, 1989), 
and some background papers and reports that were not publicly available were also obtained 
from some firms to validate the chronology of events and provide written accounts of key 
developments.  A follow up „content-checking‟ discussion was conducted with at least one 
interviewee from each firm (Miles & Huberman, 1984).  The interviews focused on two 
questions: Why did WIFs fail in China? How did their Chinese competitors defeat them?  These 
interviews offered the inside view by senior executives from these firms (Morris, et al, 1999).   
 
The Second Phase: Unstructured Elite Interviewing in Social Settings 
Over dinner, a successful entrepreneur in China asked: „Do you really think those senior 
executives would tell you how they messed up in China?‟  This concern was echoed by everyone 
at the dinner.  The Chinese saying „Pang guan zhe qing (旁观者清)‟ was offered as a solution, 
meaning „spectators can see the situation more clearly than those directly involved‟.   
In anthropology and linguistics, and social sciences more broadly, there are two long-
standing approaches to understanding the role of culture: emic, the inside view from the 
perspective of the subject within the social group; and etic, the outside view from the perspective 
of the observer (Pike, 1954; Harris, 1964, Headland, Pike & Harris, 1990).  The emic and etic 
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perspectives are sometimes seen as incommensurable paradigms, and some scholars prefer one 
over the other.  For example, Kahneman (2011) argued that the outside view is more accurate 
than inside view in forecasting.  However, most scholars regard these two approaches as 
complementary and argue for a balanced or combined strategy (Headland, Pike & Harris, 1990; 
Mauboussin 2009).  In management research, Morris, et al (1999) identified the advantages to 
combine inside and outside views and examined different forms of synergy between emic and 
etic approaches in the domain of culture and justice judgement.  This research will give equal 
treatment to inside and outside views by comparing and integrating the emic and etic insights.  
To identify the outside view from the etic perspective, 185 business, political and 
professional elites from diverse backgrounds were interviewed in the second phase, all with deep 
knowledge of China (Hout & Michael, 2014).  Different from the first phase, a more informal, 
unstructured approach was adopted.  Formal interviews are often ineffective in high context 
cultures like China or Japan (Barkema et al, 2015; Cole, 2015).  Many things are left unsaid; and 
serious business is often conducted in social settings.  The aim is twofold: 1) to identify new 
factors beyond those from the first phase; and 2) to re-interpret the insights from the first phase. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
A total of 37 informal meetings were organised during four separate trips to China in 
August 2014; June 2015; April 2016; and October 2016 (Table 2).  Each trip lasted two weeks.  
The 185 interviewees include senior business leaders and entrepreneurs from different sectors; 
business consultants and business school professors with extensive knowledge of western and 
Chinese internet firms; senior experts from leading think-tanks; senior partners from venture 
capital and private equity firms; private investors; leaders of business associations; government 
officials from municipal authorities and the central government; and business and technology 
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correspondents for national TVs and newspapers.
9
  Most meetings took place during social 
gatherings. New acquaintances were always introduced by mutual friends through social 
connections (Guanxi) (Chua, Morris & Ingram, 2009; Li & Li, 1999).  During those meetings, I 
would start a casual conversation about the phenomenon, and then invite people to give their 
views.  Findings from the first phase were used to solicit new interpretations.  The conversations 
were not recorded for obvious reasons, but notes were taken immediately afterwards.  To protect 
the identities of the interviewees, their names and positions are kept anonymous.   
The primary data is supplemented by secondary data which is summarised in Table 3.  
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------- 
 
Data Analysis  
This research is qualitative.  Despite the large number of people interviewed, statistical 
analysis or text mining using software would be inappropriate.  The focus of the research is to 
understand the views of senior executives from WIFs and their Chinese competitors, and a large 
number of business, political, and professional elites with deep knowledge of China, so a strong 
element of interpretation and judgement is involved (Barkema et al, 2015).  Most interviews 
were conducted in a mixture of Chinese and English and translated into English, so it is 
important to interpret the data beyond the literal meaning of the words, and to „read between the 
lines‟ and make sense of the data in appropriate context (Inhetveen, 2012).  Data analysis was 
guided by naturalistic inquiry using constant comparison techniques (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
                                                          
9
 Although they are not insiders from the case studies, and most of them are not from the internet industry, it can be 
argued that they are insiders to the Chinese economy and culture.  Only 12 of the 185 observers are from outside 
China (and even they are acclimatised to China to different extents), and no major differences were observed in their 
views.  Future research should examine the similarities and differences between these two types of outsiders.    
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Strauss & Gorbin, 1990).  To ensure inter-coder reliability and agreement, the unit of analysis is 
standardised as „key factors for the failure of WIFs in China‟ (Campbell et al, 2013).    
Data coding followed a three step process (Becker, 1970; Glaser, 2004; Locke, 2001; Miles 
& Huberman, 1994).  First, two researchers, both bilinguals of Chinese and English, 
independently coded all the interview notes for Yahoo and its competitor Sohu, under the 
guidance of the project leader.  Each researcher systematically identified the first order 
categories, and typical examples and quotations for each category.  The coding is then compared, 
and inconsistencies discussed and resolved by referring to the interview notes.  By standardising 
the unit of text for coding (Campbell et al, 2013), a high level of inter-coder agreement was 
achieved.  Then the interview notes for Google and Baidu were independently coded by these 
two researchers, and inconsistencies were discussed and resolved.  Following this, each 
researcher was assigned half of the remaining interview notes.  New categories were added to the 
master list until theoretical saturation was reached (Glaser, 2004).  To ensure accuracy, all new 
categories were verified with the researchers by the project leader.  In the second step, the first-
order categories are consolidated into second-order themes.  In the third step, the themes are 
further merged into aggregate dimensions (Table 4 & 5).   
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 & 5 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 A similar coding procedure was followed for the second phase interviews.  First, an initial 
sample of five interviews was coded independently by two researchers and then the results were 
compared, followed by another five interviews.  The unitisation of the text for coding helped 
ensure a high level of inter-coder agreement (Campbell et al, 2013).  The remaining interview 
notes were divided between the two researchers and all coding was verified by the project leader 
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with the researchers.  The first order categories were then consolidated into second order themes, 
and then further into aggregate dimensions (Table 6 & 7).  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 & 7 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
THE INSIDE VIEW: MAIN FINDINGS FROM THE EMIC PERSPECTIVE  
This section discusses the inside view on the failure of WIFs in China from the emic 
perspective of 40 senior executives from six WIFs in China and six of their Chinese competitors 
(Table 1).  The interview notes, totalling over 150 typed pages of A4, were coded into first order 
categories, second order themes and aggregated dimensions (Table 4 & 5).  Some of these 
factors affect all western firms in China.  However, in the „winner takes most‟ internet market 
where only two or three key players can usually survive in each market niche, these factors affect 
internet firms more than firms from other sectors; and the cumulative effect can be „the final 
straw that breaks the camel‟s back‟ for WIFs in China.     
 
Imposing Global Business Models in China 
The rigid adherence to their global business models contributed to the failure of some WIFs 
in China (Table 4 & 5).  eBay entered China in 2002, and it acquired EachNet for $180million in 
2003, a local firm with 80% of the Chinese C2C (consumer to consumer) market at the time.  
The combined group had over 2 million users and 85% of the Chinese market.  However, instead 
of building on EachNet‟s proven business model in China, eBay imposed its own global business 
model - and technological platform - onto the combined group.   
This decision reflects eBay‟s lack of deep understanding of Chinese consumer culture.  
Different from eBay, its main competitor Taobao adopted the free model and did not charge for 
listings; and its technological platform was specifically designed to facilitate trust building 
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between sellers and buyers.  Trust is particularly difficult to build in China because of the lack of 
legal protections and effective ways to resolve disputes.  While eBay relied on ratings and 
feedbacks from previous buyers to help future buyers determine which seller to do business with, 
Taobao set up online forums to encourage buyers and sellers to communicate directly, with 
instant messaging services embedded in its platform.  This helped Taobao to cultivate a sense of 
community and alleviate buyer concerns, which fits well with the retail culture in China where 
buyers and sellers often haggled aggressively over price.  At the time, China had 300 million 
mobile phone users and 90 million internet users.  Taobao offered instant messaging and 
voicemail to mobile phones.  With its free business model, Taobao was unconcerned about 
offline transactions to avoid fees.  In fact, Taobao actively encouraged buyers and sellers to 
communicate with mobile phones, instant messaging and emails outside its platform.   
Similarly, Google‟s global business model was not competitive in China.  When it entered 
China in 2005, Google faced fierce competition from Baidu and Sougo (a subsidiary of Sohu).  
Google‟s high profile exit from mainland China in 2010 was widely attributed to its dispute with 
Chinese Government over censorship and alleged cyber-attacks.  However, interviews with 
former Google executives suggested that government censorship and interference, although 
important, was not seen as the main reason for its failure.  Google‟s market share in China only 
peaked at 33%, declined to 19.3% by the time of its exit, compared to Baidu‟s 63%.  This was in 
sharp contrast to Google‟s overwhelming dominance in most other international markets it 
entered.  Google‟s business model focused too narrowly on search, generating revenue from 
advertising only.  It also insisted on payment by credit cards by advertisers.  In contrast, Baidu 
was more flexible by allowing different payment methods, offering a range of paid services to 
generate additional revenues.  In addition, Baidu developed user communities, including online 
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bulletin boards named „Tie Ba‟; „Zhidao‟, similar to Yahoo Answers; and „Baike‟, a Wikipedia 
style encyclopedia.  These services helped sustain its market share.  Eventually, Google exited 
China after it was already defeated by Baidu.  The business models of Amazon and Groupon also 
failed to compete with their Chinese rivals.   
Although business models affect every business, they are particularly crucial for internet 
firms (Massa, Tucci &Afuah, 2017).  Unlike other industries, the relationship between internet 
firms and their users are more complex and less transactional.  When an internet firm 
underperforms in its business model in a „winner takes most‟ market, the impact is often fatal.   
 
Failing to Cope with Extreme Competition in China’s Internet Market  
All WIFs are used to strong competition, but some of them were overwhelmed by the 
extreme competitive intensity in China (Table 4 & 5).  Groupon entered China in early 2011 by 
investing US$8.4 million for a 40% stake in Gaopeng, launched in partnership with Chinese 
internet giant Tencent.  It aimed to become “China‟s largest shopping site”.  Gaopeng quickly 
expanded to over 80 offices with 3,000 employees, but by August 2011 it already started scaling 
back, closing 13 offices and firing 400 people.  With over 5,000 group buying sites in China at 
the time, Groupon seriously underestimated competition.  By 2013, Groupon only held a 
minority share in Gaopeng with a mere 3% market share, lagging far behind market leaders such 
as Meituan, Lashou and many others.   
Similarly, Uber did everything possible to compete with Didi, and China briefly became 
Uber‟s largest market, accounting for over a third of its business in terms of weekly trips.  
However, Uber lost over $1bn annually in subsidies.  Although it grew from 10 cities to 60 in 12 
months, its market share only reached 8% compared to Didi‟s 80% and over 400 cities.  Uber 
eventually admitted defeat and surrendered its operations to DiDi in August 2016.  Unlike other 
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WIFs whose failures in China can be attributed to specific mistakes, Uber avoided most mistakes 
but still failed.  For the first time, Uber met a genuine competitor in DiDi.  Uber‟s approach was 
considered aggressive by the Silicon Valley standard, but it fell short by the Chinese standard.  In 
all other markets, Uber typically retained 20-25% of the passenger fare; but in China, Uber paid 
drivers a multiple of the passenger fare and lost money on every ride.  One factor singled out 
during the interviews is that Uber had other markets to consider but DiDi only had China at the 
time.  The famous battle in ancient China, Beishui Yizhan (背水一战)10, was used to illustrate 
this.  While Uber can be successful without China, Didi does not have the luxury.  For Didi, it 
was to win or die.   
The extreme competition in China also overwhelmed Amazon.  Decision making by the 
head office was often too slow; and its senior management in China lacked autonomy to compete 
effectively with local competitors.  Although competition is strong in every industry in China, 
the low entry barriers in internet services led to a very large number of competitors in China‟s 
internet market.  In fact, more CIFs have failed in China than the number of WIFs, but the very 
large base number ensured at least some of CIFs are likely to survive. This condition is 
materially different from other industries in China and other internet markets around the world.     
 
Problems with Chinese Business Partners and Local Acquisitions 
Most WIFs experienced problems with business partners and local acquisitions in China 
(Table 4 & 5).  Yahoo entered China in 1999 through a strategic partnership with Beijing 
Founder Ltd.  When it failed to compete with Sohu, Sina and Netease, it acquired 3721.com for 
                                                          
10
 During the Qin Dynasty (221-206BC), General Xiang Yu led a rebellion.  After crossing the rampant Zhang River, 
Xiang Yu ordered his men to sink all their boats and break their cooking pots. He issued each soldier three days‟ 
rations and warned them that there was no retreat.  To survive, the only way was to charge forward and defeat the 
much stronger Qin Army waiting ahead.  After nine fierce battles, the powerful Qin army was defeated.  This is 
known as Beishu Yizhan, fighting with one‟s back to the water, to win or die.   
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT DISCOVERIES (2018), Doi: 10.5465/amd.2017.0102   ©Feng Li, 2018     18 
$120 million in 2003, a company that was synonymous with search in China at the time.  Yahoo 
failed to build on 3721.com due to conflicts with its founder and was soon surpassed by Baidu.   
eBay entered China by acquiring EachNet for $180million in 2003, a local firm with 80% 
of China‟s C2C market.  However, the dominance of eBay EachNet alarmed Alibaba, at the time 
a B2B marketplace for SMEs conducting business online.  Alibaba recognised that there was no 
clear distinction between small businesses and individual consumers; and as a defensive strategy, 
it launched a C2C portal named Taobao in 2004 for $12million. Unlike eBay, Taobao did not 
charge for listings, which enabled it to eat away eBay EachNet‟s market shares and eventually 
overtake it by 2006, forcing eBay to exit the Chinese market.    
Amazon entered China in 2004 through the acquisition of Joyo.com for $75m, one of two 
dominant online retailers specialising in books, CD/DVDs and software downloading.  However, 
it struggled to compete with DangDang, the main rival of Joyo.com at the time, which Amazon 
failed to take over with a reported $150m offer.  When Amazon moved into selling other goods, 
it earned a reputation as being more expensive than other online platforms.  Its market share in 
China was only 1.1%, dwarfed by JD.com (22.8%) and Alibaba‟s Tmall (58.6%).  In 2015, it 
even opened an online store on Tmall, but its decline continued.  Its cloud service, AWS, also 
fell behind the cloud services offered by Alibaba, Tecent, Baidu, Huwei and many others.   
Groupon assumed it could simply acquire the largest group buying site in China, but its 
offers to Lashou were repeated rejected.  Its partnership with Tencent was hailed as a major 
competitive advantage, but in hindsight, it was a mismatch.  For Tencent, group buying was not a 
priority; and it also operated its own group buying business, QQ Group Buy, which is bigger 
than Gaopeng.  Groupon failed to capitalise on Tencent‟s massive user base, government 
connections and management talents, which contributed to its downfall.   
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Although partnership issues are important for all foreign firms in China, Yahoo, eBay, 
Amazon and Groupon cited it explicitly as one of the main reasons for their failure in China.   
 
Imposing Global Technological Platforms in China 
Most WIFs expanded into foreign markets by using the same technological platforms that 
brought them success in their home markets.  However, this approach left opportunities for 
Chinese competitors to launch platforms specially designed for China (Table 4 & 5).  For 
example, Yahoo insisted on adhering to its global technological platform in China despite the 
significant market differences between China and the US, which played a key part in its failure.    
Google‟s search engine was originally developed for English search, which could not 
match the purpose-built Chinese search engines by Baidu and 3721.com.  There was a strong 
perception by users that Google was foreign while Baidu was made for China; and the search 
results from Baidu were often more relevant.  Although Google addressed this by hiring over 100 
engineers to add new codes for Chinese language search, the effort was constrained by its global 
technological platform.  This contributed to Google‟s failure in China (Table 5).   
Unlike many other industries, cultural sensitivity is strategically crucial for internet 
services.  Foreign platforms adapted for China leave opportunities open for local firms to launch 
incrementally better platforms to gain market share and eventually win the competition.   
 
Centralised Organisational Structures and Slow Decision Making  
A perceived competitive advantage for WIFs in China is the resources and support from 
their global parents, but the centralised organisational structures, slow decision making by the 
head offices and the lack of local autonomy contributed to their failure (Table 4 & 5).  For 
example, when Yahoo China came up with new ideas, approval from the US head office was 
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often required.  The process could take weeks, so even when permission was eventually given, it 
was often too late.  In contrast, CIFs often made and implemented decisions on the same day.   
Google‟s former China head blame corporate bureaucracy and lack of local autonomy as 
the main reasons for its failure, a sentiment echoed by the people we interviewed. Similarly, in 
Amazon and eBay, the lack of local autonomy contributed to their rapid downfall (Table 5).  
Groupon used German speaking expatriates to head up its China operation, some of them 
relied on interpreters to communicate with employees, clients and partners.  Some expatriates 
used management tactics that were ineffective in China, which contributed to its failure.   
Centralised organisational structures and slow decision making affect most western firms in 
China, but given how rapidly the internet market is changing, they can significantly impede 
WIFs‟ ability to compete effectively which contributed to their failure.   
 
Poor Understanding of the Chinese Market  
Failure to understand the Chinese market has been cited for the failure of all WIFs in China 
(Table 4 & 5).  For example, soon after Taobao was launched, eBay signed exclusive advertising 
rights with major portals including Sina, Sohu, and Netease, with implicit intention to block 
advertising from Taobao.  This forced Taobao to advertise on TV instead, which ironically 
proved far more effective than other channels to reach small business owners and individual 
customers.  To facilitate payment, Alibaba launched Alipay, which provided escrow service and 
insurance for buyers and sellers.  Taobao also encouraged „cash on delivery‟ by signing formal 
agreements with logistical providers, which became a major attraction for buyers and sellers.   
Groupon successfully built its initial customer base in the US and Europe by targeting 
young, educated women who had the time and money to try new things, but this strategy did not 
work in China.  It targeted top restaurants in different food categories in China but „these 
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categories were largely irrelevant in China‟ according to a former executive.  The biggest 
consumer base are “young white collar office workers in their 20s-30s who love to eat lunch in 
packs in big shopping malls, but you aren‟t going to reach those vendors from a call centre!‟  
When negotiating with vendors, Groupon insisted on 50-50 profit split, but the typical profit split 
in China was 10-90 to the vendor due to strong competition.  Groupon was often told to „go 
away and don‟t come back until you have something realistic to offer‟.   
Groupon adopted a strategy in Europe by using high salaries to poach its competitors‟ top 
employees.  The use of this approach in China resulted in some Chinese competitors joining 
forces to issue a formal statement that any employee who left to work for Groupon would never 
be hired by any firm in the alliance.  Groupon insisted on using mass email marketing despite 
being warned that Chinese people seldom read such emails.  Its reliance on foreign expatriates 
resulted in high employee turnover.  
This problem affects all western firms, but for internet firms the market segments in China 
are so different that what worked in the West often did not work in China.  This gives Chinese 
competitors a natural competitive edge, which translated into market shares.     
 
Failing to Manage Regulatory Environment, Government Relations and Infrastructure 
Some WIFs failed to adapt their business models, technological platforms and 
organisational structures for China‟s infrastructure (e.g. telecom, transport) and supporting 
services (e.g. banking, logistics), which resulted in major operational challenges.  However, 
while government control and censorship and lack of adequate IP protection in China have been 
widely cited as a main reason for the failure of WIFs in China (e.g. Wang & Ren, 2012; Zeng & 
Glaister, 2016), this view was not supported by the people we interviewed.  For example, former 
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executives from Yahoo and Google explicitly argued that these factors were only secondary, and 
instead attributed their failures in China to other major factors (Table 4 & 5).   
While adapting for China‟s infrastructure is operationally important for all foreign firms, 
managing the regulatory environment and government relations is strategically crucial for WIFs.  
All firms, foreign or domestic, need to abide by local laws and regulations, but this is particularly 
crucial for internet services.  To different extents, the internet is under government control and 
surveillance everywhere, including the USA and Europe.  In China, some internet services are 
viewed as ideologically sensitive, and the laws and regulations governing their use are often 
more strict than - or simply different - from the West.  When a WIF refuses to cooperate with 
relevant authorities or abide by local laws and regulations, their services could be blocked or 
banned.  Even a temporary service outage could hand significant advantages to competitors in 
the extremely competitive Chinese internet market, as some users might never come back.   
 
THE OUTSIDE VIEW - FINDINGS FROM THE ETIC PERSPECTIVE  
The second phase interviews use the etic perspective to identify key factors from the 
outside view.  The interview notes, totalling over 200 typed pages of A4, are coded and 
summarised in Table 6 & 7.  The outside view not only confirmed some factors from the inside 
view, but also identified three new factors that were missing from the inside view.   
 
Losing by Numbers: One in a Hundred against One in a Million  
Although the inside viewed identified extreme competition in China as a key factor, the 
outside view highlighted the very large number of competitors explicitly for the phenomenon.  
Most WIFs entered China to dominate the Chinese market.  However, competition is relative. 
What is considered aggressive by western standard is often seen as mild in China (Table 6 & 7).  
Due to the sheer number of internet firms and the huge size of the Chinese market, competition is 
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often extremely fierce (Woetzel et al, 2017).  To survive, all CIFs have to compete with a far 
greater pool of local competitors than any WIFs have ever encountered.  This is known as the 
„huge crowd strategy‟ (人海战术 – Ren hai zhan shu), which gives CIFs an implicit advantage.   
The Chinese sayings of „Bai li tiao yi‟ (百里挑一, one in a hundred) versus „Wan li tiao yi‟ 
(万里挑一, one in ten thousands) were often used to illustrate this point.  If western internet 
behemoths such as Amazon and Google succeeded in the US by beating hundreds of competitors, 
then Alibaba and Baidu would have to beat tens of thousands of competitors in China to get 
where they are.  The relatively weak and unpredictable regulatory environment also made 
competition in China extremely fierce and „no holds barred‟.  One entrepreneur described the 
competition as akin to a fight between a boxer and a street fighter: „while the boxer is still 
waiting for the referee to blow the whistle, the street fighter already kicked him in the head and 
the fight is over.‟  Furthermore, even if one CIF is defeated or acquired by WIFs, there are a 
relentless army of other CIFs waiting in the wings, often with improved business models and 
stronger determination.  The odds for success are stacked against WIFs in China.   
In addition, as the largest internet market in the world by user numbers, China can sustain 
more service providers than any other markets; and it is far more difficult for any internet firm to 
dominate and then maintain the dominance in China than in any other countries.  For example, 
when Google entered countries such as the Netherland, the Google search engine adapted from 
English to Dutch is probably „good enough‟ for the majority of the Dutch speaking population.  
With a population of 17 million, the Dutch market is probably too small for a new search engine 
to be financially viable even if it is incrementally better than Google.  However, with over 750 
million internet users in China and growing, a mere 1% market share would translate into 
7.5million users, so it is much easier for an incrementally better search engine to achieve 
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financial viability in China than in the Netherland.  The fact that tens of millions of new internet 
users enter the market each year also makes the market more attractive to new service providers.  
This explains why some WIFs (e.g. eBay, Amazon) dominated China briefly but then failed to 
lock out competitors and maintain their dominance.   
Although CIFs have imitated WIFs during the early days, many CIFs have since 
established themselves as distinctly Chinese, by understanding local users, building relations, 
cultivating business ecosystems, and improving technologies, products and business models.  
Taobao is not eBay‟s equivalent in China, nor is JD.com or Tmall China‟s Amazon.  These CIFs 
have defeated numerous local competitors to get to the top, and they are very hard to beat. 
Furthermore, all WIFs have significant business interests in other markets and can continue to be 
successful without China, but most CIFs did not have that luxury.  This gave CIFs the extra 
motivation and determination needed to do anything necessary to survive in China.   
 
Failure by Strategies: From ‘The Art of War’ to ‘The Thirty Six Stratagems’ 
The inside view highlighted other strategic mistakes made by WIFs, but this factor was 
only identified by the outside view.  The head of a leading PE firm argued that the failure of 
WIFs in China went far beyond the specific mistakes they made.  CIFs have, explicitly and 
implicitly, drawn inspirations from ancient Chinese military strategies and tactics to change the 
nature of competition (Table 6 & 7).  Such strategies are deeply ingrained in Chinese history and 
culture and widely used in everyday language, which enables more effective strategy making and 
communication by CIFs.  This point was echoed by many others, including a multi-billion dollar 
business founder and a successful serial tech entrepreneur.  The Art of War is a Chinese military 
strategy book by Sun Tsu dating from the 5th century BC.  The Thirty Six Stratagems, a 
collection of warfare wisdom derived over many centuries of inter-state conflict in China, was 
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also widely used.  Another source of inspiration is the military strategies of the late Chairman 
Mao during the war with Japan and the civil war with the Nationalist army in 1930s and 1940s.  
These strategies allowed CIFs to develop and communicate their business strategies effectively, 
with great cumulative effects.  Many examples were used to illustrate this point.   
When eBay acquired EachNet in China in 2003 and dominated 85% of China‟s C2C 
market, Jack Ma‟s Taobao was in no position to launch a head on assault.  Since ‟good fighters 
first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then wait for an opportunity to defeat 
the enemy‟ (Sun Tsu), Ma literally adopted Mao‟s strategy that helped the weaker Communist 
army defeating the stronger Nationalist army to guide the communication of his strategic intent: 
„first encircle cities from rural areas, and eventually take control of the cities and the whole 
country‟.  This strategy is widely understood by Chinese people.  By focusing on users at the low 
end and using the free business model to disrupt eBay, Taobao pushed eBay out of China.    
 
Whoever Blinks First Loses: Beaten By More Determined Competitors  
This factor was emphasised by both the inside view and outside view.  Most WIFs made 
mistakes in China, but in the case of Uber, it was not simply a matter of what it did wrong, but 
what Didi Chuxing did better (Table 6 & 7).  When Uber entered China, Didi already had a head 
start.  Despite the perceived competitive advantages for Uber, Didi was simply more determined, 
with more cash reserves than Uber for a prolonged price war.  In many ways, the competition 
between them was reminiscent of the reckless land grabbing during the early dot.com era, but the 
difference is that both firms have the resources and long term visions to capture market shares 
first before making profits.  In the end, Uber blinked first and lost.   
All WIFs we studied acquired, or made attempts to acquire the market leaders in China.  
However, in subsequent competitions, CIFs simply showed stronger determination to survive at 
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any costs.  Most CIFs initially imitated western services and technologies, but thing quickly 
progressed beyond copying.
11
  Tencent and Alibaba are constantly reinventing their services, 
technologies, business models and ecosystems, and investing heavily in innovations.  Tencent is 
building a business ecosystem on top of a social network; and about half of its revenues come 
from its games business.
12
  Alibaba has built a business ecosystem and is creating a social 
platform to sustain it.  It acquired physical stores long before Amazon acquired Whole Food 
Market.
13
  Services from CIFs often have more features tailor-made for Chinese users.  Their 
exclusive Chinese focus gave them a competitive edge over their globally oriented competitors. 
 
New Digital Rules of the Game: Differences between Internet and Traditional Businesses 
Some fundamental differences between internet and traditional businesses contributed to 
the failure of WIFs in China, and this factor was only identified by the outside view (Table 6 & 
7).  Internet services usually have a much shorter lifecycle compared with traditional industries; 
and WIFs only have 2-3 years rather than decades to fine-tune their business models and educate 
customers.  This limited the buildup of any sustainable advantages by WIFs and gives Chinese 
internet firms a much better chance to compete with them than in traditional industries.  Unlike 
aerospace or pharmaceuticals, most internet firms do not rely on cutting edge technologies so the 
entry barriers are relatively low.  Car engines are far more difficult to imitate than search engines.  
The ancillary assets and tacit knowledge embedded in production processes and supply chains in 
traditional industries also serve as major entry barriers.  As a result, WIFs have fewer 
competitive advantages and face far more competitors than western firms from other sectors.   
                                                          
11
 China vs US: who is copying whom? Financial Times, 18 September 2017, https://goo.gl/PvuKYs 
12
 Chinese fantasy role playing game has 50m active players, Financial Times, https://goo.gl/cA4YSY 
13
 Alibaba taps user data to drive growth spurt.  The Financial Times, 22 June 2017.  https://goo.gl/aePWMb 
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A related area that makes digital businesses unique is the sources of value added.  For firms 
such as Intel, a significant proportion of its value comes from the technologies embedded in the 
CPU processors, with the rest coming from marketing, distribution, business networks and so on.  
The advantages embedded in its core products, business processes and brand will ensure its 
success in China even if it underperforms Chinese competitors in other aspects.  In contrast, 
internet firms have few advanced technologies or ancillary services that would give them 
sustainable advantages over local competitors.  If they underperform in areas such as strategic 
partnership and customer relations, the value added from their core products or business 
processes is insufficient to compensate for the shortfalls.  Compared with traditional industries, 
WIFs have few competitive advantages but many disadvantages.  This is very different from 
most other industries where western firms often have clear competitive advantages to build on.
14
     
 
Failing to Be Embedded in China  
Some aspects of this factor were highlighted by the inside view, and it was also strongly 
emphasised by the outside view.  All WIFs we studied have shown a lack of deep understanding 
of the Chinese market (Table 6 & 7).  They found it difficult to compete with Chinese 
entrepreneurs in serving the local market.  This is not only reflected in understanding users and 
customers, but also internally within the firms.  Senior expatriates parachuted down from the 
head office often lacked culture sensitivity, damaging relations without realising it.  The 
                                                          
14
 Technological advantages by western firms are difficult, but not impossible, to overcome.  Chinese firm Huawei 
managed to overcome technological advantages by western firms to become the world‟s largest telecom equipment 
provider.  However, its success is not easily replicable.  Huawei first set up joint ventures with state owned firms 
under the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications in China to distribute imported products from Hong Kong, 
which secured its access to technology, capital and market, „killing three birds with one stone‟.  It then used the cash 
piles and the low cost advantages in China to invest aggressively in R&D and rapidly built up large scale 
technological capabilities within the firm.  The average cost for an engineer in China was US$25,000 compared to 
$120-150,000 in Europe.  Chinese engineers on average work 2750 hours compared to 13-1400 hours in Europe.  
This allows Huawei to employ 13,000 engineers and drastically reduce cost, accelerate product development and 
increase profitability, and then use generous financial incentives to ensure staff loyalty and dedication.  Further, the 
transition of the telecom market from technology-driven to market-driven in recent years also served to reduce the 
impact of technological advantages by western firms and help Huawei to succeed both in China and internationally.     
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recruitment policy of WIFs favours English speaking candidates, which attracts particular types 
of people and excludes a significant proportion of talented but non-English speaking candidates.  
Most WIFs in China use English as the official language for internal communications which is 
ineffective - and indeed, rather silly, when 20-30 Chinese employees communicate in English at 
meetings in China when just one or two foreign expatriates are present.   
One consequence is that most WIFs overlooked the Chinese social structure and focused 
primarily on the middle class market as they did in the West, thus losing the majority of non-
middle class users to Chinese competitors.  Unlike developed countries, the middle class 
represents a relatively small proportion of the Chinese population.  Employees in WIFs – usually 
educated, English speaking, middle class white collar workers in big cities - will struggle to truly 
understand the needs, life styles and preferences of people from lower social classes in smaller 
cities and rural areas.  CIFs are generally more sensitive to local trends in different areas.   
Unlike CIFs, WIFs use emails extensively for internal and external communications, which 
is cheap and convenient but ineffective.  They can supplement, but not replace, phone calls, face 
to face meetings, and business entertainment in China.  Wechat from Tencent is an essential 
communications tool used by 963 million monthly active users (Q2, 2017).  Most Chinese people 
are using it to share information and manage their business and social relations both within and 
outside work.  However, many foreign executives use WhatsApp rather than Wechat and are 
therefore left out of important social and business circles and networks in China.   
Failing to be embedded in China affects all western firms, but its impact on internet 
services is crucial, as the competition is fierce, the growth is fast, and the market is culturally 
sensitive and „winner takes most‟.  It played a key role in the failure of all WIFs in China.  
 
Innovating by Experimenting: Crossing River by Feeling the Stone 
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT DISCOVERIES (2018), Doi: 10.5465/amd.2017.0102   ©Feng Li, 2018     29 
This factor was only highlighted by the outside view.  Deng Xiaoping famously described 
China‟s economic reform as „crossing the river by feeling the stones on the riverbed‟.  This 
strategy has served China well, resulting in four decades of rapid economic growth, lifting 
hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty (Steinfeld & Beltoft, 2014; Li & Li, 1999).  
This mentality is deeply embedded in contemporary Chinese culture.  In facing strong 
competition from WIFs, nearly every CIF followed this approach (Table 6 & 7).  Unlike WIFs 
which have established procedures for developing and implementing innovations, CIFs are often 
more result-oriented and more prepared to innovate by experiming.  If a new idea works, then 
scale it up rapidly; if not, move onto other ideas.  Chinese consumers are generally more tolerant 
of such product development processes than in the West, which enable CIFs to test and refine 
many new ideas very quickly at low cost, with significant cumulative effects.  
 
DISCUSSIONS 
Many factors are collectively responsible for the failure of WIFs in China.  The inside view 
from the emic perspective of senior executives of WIFs and their Chinese competitors 
highlighted the poor understanding of Chinese market, imposing global business models and 
technological platforms in China, failing to cope with extreme competition, problems with 
business partners, and lack of local autonomy and slow decision making (Table 4 & 5).  The 
outside view from the etic perspective of observers identified the large number of and the very 
determined local competitors, the use of strategies deeply rooted in Chinese history and culture, 
fundamental differences between digital and traditional businesses, failure to be embedded in 
China, and innovating by experimenting (Table 6 & 7).   
Most factors identified by the inside view also apply to western firms from other sectors, 
but they are explicitly highlighted by senior executives from WIFs and their Chinese competitors 
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for the phenomenon.  The outside view not only confirmed some of these factors, but also 
highlighted three new factors: using strategies rooted in Chinese history and culture, differences 
between internet and traditional businesses, and innovating by experimenting.  Despite the 
differences between the inside view and outside view in the first order categories and second 
order themes, they converged in the aggregate dimensions around 1). poor understanding of the 
business environment, 2). ineffective strategy making and communication, and 3). under-
performing Chinese competitors in operation and execution (Table 4 & 6).  
During both phases of the research, people were explicitly asked whether they could single 
out one reason that led to, or played the most crucial part in, the failure of WIFs in China.  
Everyone believed that it was not one single factor, or a particular decision or action, but the 
cumulative effects of multiple factors or actions that led to their failure.  However, two 
distinctive prevailing narratives have emerged from the inside view and outside view.   
 
Lack of Strategic Determination and Patience in China 
The prevailing narrative emerging from the inside view centred on the lack of strategic 
determination and patience by WIFs in China.  This factor was also explicitly highlighted by the 
outside view.  When WIFs entered China, most of them have already achieved scale and 
dominance in their home markets and other important international markets.  Their China 
strategy is only a subset of their global strategy.  However, the challenges they encountered in 
China are far greater than they experienced anywhere else, and few WIFs had the mental 
preparation, strategic determination and long term patience required to dominate the Chinese 
market.  WIFs have to weigh up the cost and benefit in China with other markets.  When the cost 
in China exceeds expected future returns, admitting defeat is often the best option.  In contrast, 
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CIFs focused almost exclusively on China, and it was a game of survival.  This gives CIFs the 
extra strategic determination and patience needed to survive at any cost.    
Most WIFs in China made strategic mistakes, particularly by imposing their global 
business models and technological platforms in China that are not fully attuned to the local 
market; and many of them experienced difficulties with local acquisitions and business partners.  
The market structure and user behaviour in China are very different from the West.  There are 
major disparities in the level of economic development within and between regions in China, 
such as income levels, infrastructure development and support services (e.g. logistics, banking 
and payment); and significant cultural differences between urban and rural areas and the large 
number of Provinces.  CIFs have been more effective in developing strategies and operations to 
cater for such variations, even by building entire new ecosystems, which enabled them to 
increase market shares and eventually defeat WIFs in China.    
 
Failing to Acclimatise to China’s Business Environment 
The prevailing narrative emerging from the outside view is that WIFs failed to acclimatise 
to China‟s business environment which is materially different from the West.  Some aspects of 
this narrative was also highlighted by the inside view.  This was often illustrated by a popular 
Chinese phrase, ‘Bu jie di qi’(不接地气), meaning WIFs failed to keep their feet firmly on 
the ground or be deeply embedded in China.  The regulatory environment in China is complex, 
and the policies and regulations are often underdeveloped, inconsistently interpreted and 
implemented, and change rapidly and erratically.  There are strict government censorship and 
control in some areas, but lack of control in others (e.g. privacy), which creates both operational 
challenges and new opportunities for radical innovations (e.g. collecting and monetising user 
data).  This calls for significant expertise in understanding and anticipating subtle changes in 
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policies and regulations; and extensive connections with central and local governments and its 
complex divisions and departments.  CIFs are generally more flexible, and politically and 
culturally more savvy, in managing government relations and anticipating regulatory and policy 
changes.  It is too simplistic to blame government censorship and control for the failure of WIFs 
in China, as both CIFs and WIFs need to comply with government rules.   
In addition, most CIFs used tried and tested strategies that are deeply ingrained in Chinese 
history and culture, which gives them a clear edge in strategy making and communication.  Their 
innovation strategies allowed them to try out numerous new products efficiently which translated 
into market shares.  Most WIFs failed to appreciate the differences between internet and 
traditional businesses, and the challenges involved in dominating the largest internet market in 
the world, which is culturally, politically and economically different from the West.  Even when 
one CIF is defeated or acquired, WIFs have to face the relentless assaults from other CIFs.  
 
Why Have All WIFs failed in China? The ‘Perfect Storm’ 
In many ways the internet market is fundamentally different from other industries.  WIFs 
only had a short history to build up any inimitable advantages.  The low technological barriers 
allowed a very large number of CIFs to be set up in China.  As a culture market it favours native 
firms in understanding users and the business environment, and in developing and 
communicating strategies.  The network effect means „winner takes most‟.  When faced with 
more determined and locally embedded Chinese competitors, who are fully attuned to the 
Chinese business environment, WIFs have few competitive advantages but many disadvantages.  
It is the „perfect storm‟ that led to the systematic failure of all WIFs in China (Table 8).     
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
----------------------------- 
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Compared with other industries, WIFs in China encountered levels of competition they 
never experienced anywhere else.  The speed of change and the short life cycle for digital 
services eroded traditional advantages enjoyed by western firms from other sectors.  CIFs built 
and rapidly expanded their business ecosystems through strategic alliances and diversification, 
which created new revenue streams and improved resilience.  They hired dedicated personnel to 
build and maintain government relations to ensure deep understanding and early anticipation of 
changes in policy and regulations which translated into strategic and operational advantages.    
Most WIFs failed to delegate sufficient autonomy, made worse by their centralised 
organisational structures and slow decision making.  This led to slow responses to local 
competition; lack of deep understanding of Chinese market and culture; and limited ability to 
build partnership and strategic alliances.  CIFs enjoyed significant advantages by catering for 
every imaginable user needs in different parts of China which translated into market shares.  
Unlike WIFs, most CIFs designed their technological platforms and business models for China.  
Their services are developed and fine-tuned for Chinese users, based on deep understanding of 
Chinese culture and continuous user engagements, which cumulated to operational advantages.   
WIFs failed to match CIFs in understanding the business environment, and conceded 
strategic and operational advantages.  They lacked strategic determination and patience, and 
failed to acclimatise to a market that is materially different.  Their failure so far is inevitable.   
 
Managerial Implications 
This research identified a wide range of factors for the systematic failure of WIFs in China.  
Some of them are unique to internet firms, but others are generic which affect all western firms.  
Addressing some or even all of these factors does not guarantee success (e.g. Uber), but failing 
to address any of them can lead to failure.  To succeed in China, WIFs need to bring genuine 
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT DISCOVERIES (2018), Doi: 10.5465/amd.2017.0102   ©Feng Li, 2018     34 
technological advantages and be deeply embedded in China with total commitment, exclusive 
focus and unwavering determination.  Their products, platforms and business models need to be 
purpose built and fine-tuned for China, not adapted from another market, as this leaves 
opportunities for Chinese competitors to launch incrementally better products and platforms.  
Strong local autonomy is essential.  Remote control from the West will not work.     
Interestingly, this research found that government censorship and control is not seen as the 
primary reason for the failure of WIFs in China (Table 5).  Ideologically, some WIFs may not 
agree with the way the internet is governed or monitored in China.  However, respecting and 
abiding by local laws and regulations is a pre-condition for any firm to operate in any jurisdiction.  
Seeking to change China through direct confrontation with the Chinese government by one or a 
group of WIFs, however big or powerful they are, is highly risky.  For now at least, WIFs have 
no choice but to adapt for China - or continue to stay out of the Chinese market.   
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The reasons for the systematic failure of WIFs in China are complex.  Existing 
international business theory, the OLI eclectic paradigm, could not convincingly explain why the 
perceived competitive advantages for western multinational firms failed to translate into 
sustainable operational success for WIFs in China.  A range of factors have been identified from 
both the emic perspective of senior executives from WIFs and their Chinese competitors, and the 
etic perspective of elite observers from diverse social, political and professional backgrounds.  
WIFs failed to understand and manage the complex business environment, adapt their strategies 
and business models for the Chinese market, and develop new technologies and services to cater 
for the needs of Chinese users.  They underestimated Chinese competitors and the huge 
challenges involved in dominating the largest internet market by user numbers.  In contrast to 
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other sectors where western firms maintained multiple advantages in technologies, products and 
services, strategy and organisation, WIFs had few genuine advantages but many disadvantages.   
Similar patterns have been observed in other internet services, cloud services, mobile 
communications, fintech, and some non-digital sectors (e.g. solar energy, electric cars, and high-
speed trains).  Further, new battle lines have been drawn between Chinese and western firms in 
artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), driverless cars, and in some industries 
where western firms traditionally held major technological and other advantages.  Some WIFs 
such as Google are re-entering the Chinese market.  As CIFs grow bigger and more confident, 
they are actively pursuing new opportunities in other markets – from India, South East Asia, 
Africa to the USA and Europe - so the clashes between CIFs and WIFs are likely to escalate both 
in China and internationally.   
So far, WIFs have underperformed their Chinese competitors in nearly every aspect in 
China, but their disadvantages are not insurmountable.  To succeed in China, WIFs need to bring 
genuine technological and other advantages in order to overcome, or compensate for, their 
disadvantages.  Future research should further examine the key factors that lead to the systematic 
failure of WIFs in China, particularly by testing propositions and developing new theoretical 
frameworks; and identify and validate effective new strategies to compete in China.   
Historically, Chinese companies are seen as rapid adopters of innovations generated 
elsewhere rather than breakthrough inventors themselves, but things are changing rapidly.  
Today, more goods move through Alibaba‟s platforms than Amazon‟s; and Tencent‟s WeChat is 
Facebook, FaceTime, WhatsApp, PayPal and LinkedIn all rolled into one.  China has a massive 
lead over the USA and Europe in mobile payment.  Many Chinese firms now have a level of 
self-assurance and success on the world stage that is allowing them to experiment with their own 
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ways of working.  China has highly distinctive cultures and traditions on which its own 
management theories and practice can be built.  It is important for future research to continue to 
examine this and other emerging phenomena in China, and the lessons from such research may 
shed light on our understanding of globalisation strategies in rapid-changing industries, with 
potential implications for general management theories in the digital age.  
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TABLE 1: INTERVIEWS WITH WESTERN INTERNET FIRMS AND THEIR CHINESE COMPETITORS  
 
Company Business Year  Main Features Current Status Interviews Dates 
Yahoo Content 
provider 
1999 Joint venture and acquisition of 
3721.com 
Taken over by Alibaba in 2005 but took 40% Alibaba 
shares.  Closed down by Alibaba in 2013 
4 Apr 2012 
Sohu Content 
provider 
1998 Web portal, advertising, search 
engine, multiplayer games etc  
NASDAQ listed, with over 30% market share in China  3 Apr 2012 
eBay C2C 
retailer 
2003 Acquisition of Eachnet.com Market share dropped from 85% to under 10% by 2006 and 
sold to Tom online in 2007  
3 Aug 2012 
Taobao C2C 
retailer 
2003 Part of Alibaba Group Over 80% market share.  3 Aug 2012 
Google Search 
Engine 
2006 Wholly owned subsidiary Market share peaked at 33% and dropped to 19.3% when it 
exited the Chinese mainland market in 2006 
5 Feb 2013 
Baidu Search 
engine 
2000 Dominant search engine in China Over 70% of the search market  4 Feb 2013 
Amazon B2C 
retailer 
2004 Acquisition of Joyo.com Still operational with 0.8% market share in 2016.  Opened 
online store on Alibaba‟s TMall in 2015.   
4 Feb 2013 
JD.com B2C 
retailer 
2004 One of two dominant B2C online 
retailers (with Alibaba‟s Tmall).  
31.2% of the B2C market in 2016 & growing faster than 
Tmall (51.3%). 
3 Feb 2013 
Groupon Group buy 2011 Joint venture with Tencent and 
monitory ownership of Gaopeng 
Less than 3% market share in 2016 through minority 
shareholding in Gaopeng 
5 May 2013 
Meituan Group buy 2010 Merged with Dianping in 2015 The largest group buy site in China 2 May 2013 
Uber Ride 
hailing 
2013 Wholly owned subsidiary Acquired by Didi Chuxing in 2016 but owned 20% shares in 
the combined firm. 
2 Sept 2016 
Didi 
Chuxing 
Ride 
hailing 
2012 Merger of Didi Dache and Kuaidi 
Dache; acquired Uber China in 2016 
Over 80% market share   2 Sept 2016 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF SECOND PHASE INTERVIEWS 
 
August 2014 
(9/52) 
 
 Lunch meeting with the CEO and COO of a multi-billion dollar private sector enterprise in China (2) 
 Dinner meeting with a senior business and technology correspondent of a major national TV channel (1) 
 Drinks with two senior executives of a large technology firm in China (2) 
 Dinner with senior executives from Chinese internet firms and former senior executives of western internet firms (3) 
 Meeting with three senior business Professors at a top Chinese University (3) 
 Meeting with senior academics from the Technology and Innovation department in a top university business school (8) 
 Informal discussions with other invited speakers after a corporate event over drinks and dinner, including a private investor, a tech 
entrepreneur, a former executive of a multinational conglomerate in China, two senior government officials, a journalist, and the 
CEO and COO of a large corporate (8)  
 Social gathering over dinner including tech entrepreneurs and business executives, senior partners of PE and VC funds, business 
consultants, senior civil servants, and university professors (10) 
 Social gathering involving senior professionals from the private and public sectors (15) 
June 2015 
(10/45) 
 Dinner with the CEO and MD of a large Hongkong listed private sector company in China (2) 
 Lunch with the CEO of a large American multinational firm in China (1) 
 Meeting over drinks with the head of a large PE fund in China (1) 
 Coffee meeting with a business and technology correspondent of a major national newspaper (1) 
 Lunch with a senior business professor at a top Chinese university and members of his research group (5)  
 Lunch meeting with two European business professors working in two top Chinese Universities (2) 
 Meeting and lunch with the Head of business school in a top university in China (1) 
 Dinner with senior executives of a large conglomerate after an invited talk at a corporate event (5) 
 Discussions with senior and mid-level Chinese business executives after an invited talk at a corporate event in China (15) 
 Social gathering involving senior professionals from the private and public sectors (12) 
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT DISCOVERIES (2018), Doi: 10.5465/amd.2017.0102   ©Feng Li, 2018     39 
April 2016 
(8/38) 
 Extended business/social trip with the CEO of a large Chinese conglomerate, a former senior executive of a large Chinese technology firm 
and successful investor, and the CFO of a large Chinese private sector firm (3)  
 Lunch meeting with senior civil servants and government officials of a major city (3) 
 Lunch and informal discussions with the China Head of a major multinational business/tech consulting firm; Head of a Chinese business 
association; Head of a Chinese and Japanese Business Association; Head of a major think tank in China (4) 
 Meeting with the CEO of a major American business consulting firm in China and the China head of an American PE Fund (2) 
 Discussions with senior and mid-level business executives in a large Chinese conglomerate after an invited executive talk (10) 
 Lunch and afternoon discussions with the CEO of a large conglomerate and the head of a think tank and his deputy (3) 
 Dinner with the CEO of a large private sector business and former CEO of a large retailer in China (1) 
 Group social gathering involving mostly senior professionals from different sectors (12) 
October 
2016 
(10/48) 
 Informal discussions over dinner with senior executives after a keynote address at a major business event (6) 
 Meeting with a former China executive of western internet firm and founder of a successful sharing economy business (1) 
 Meeting with a Senior executive of a Chinese internet firm and a mutual friend (2) 
 Lunch with an American Angel Investor in China and a mutual friend (2) 
 Afternoon tea with a private investor in Chinese and western internet firms (1) 
 Extended meeting and informal discussions with the CEO of a large Chinese conglomerate (1) 
 Lunch and afternoon tea with the CEO of a large state owned enterprise in China and a private investor (2)  
 Group dinner including entrepreneurs and senior business executives, senior business consultants, senior civil servants and government 
officials, university professors, and a senior executive of a foreign multinational (10) 
 Group dinner including senior civil servants in municipal government, senior business executives, private business owners,  tech 
entrepreneurs, angel investors and senior business consultant (11) 
 Group social gathering involving senior professionals from different sectors (14).   
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TABLE 3: DESCRIPTION OF THE SECONDARY DATA 
 
Data types Data sources Data amount  Data use 
 
 
News Reports and 
Commentaries  
Articles from English and Chinese Newspapers, 
Business Magazines and the websites of major 
news agencies, including but not limited to The 
Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, The Daily 
Telegraph, The Guardian, The China Daily, The 
People‟s Daily, The Economic Daily, The 
Economist, Fortune, Business Week, Bloomberg, 
CNN, BBC, Xinhua News and others. 
1534 articles concerning WIFs in China, 
major initiatives by CIFs, the latest 
development in the digital economy and e-
commerce in China, new policy initiatives 
and changes concerning internet services 
and digital firms in China, and other 
relevant background information 
Primarily used as a secondary source 
of information to initiate questions 
and discussions during interviews, 
confirming chronology of events and 
major developments; and 
triangulating and validating data 
collected from the interviews.   
 
 
Research Reports 
(public) 
Research reports from Business Consulting Firms, 
Research Institutions and Chinese government 
agencies, such as Mckinsey, BCG, Bain, Gartner, 
iResearch, Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology, China Academy of Social Sciences.  
Some commercial reports by major investment 
banks, (Citi, BAML, JP Morgan and HSBC) on 
these internet firms were also obtained.  
A total of 86 reports containing 
comprehensive background information 
about Western and Chinese internet firms, 
the digital economy and e-commerce 
development in China in general and in 
different niche areas and regions, and 
emerging technological and business trends 
in China and globally 
Primarily used as background 
information and the business context 
for understanding, validating and 
analysing the data collected from the 
interviews.  Selected reports are 
referenced directly in the paper.    
 
Reports and other 
internal documents 
by relevant internet 
firms (Private) 
Reports produced by western and Chinese internet 
firms, for example, from Ali Research, Baidu and 
Tencent.  Some of these reports are publicly 
released, but internal reports from some case 
studies not publically available were also obtained 
through personal contacts.  
17 reports on major strategic initiatives and 
significant emerging technological and 
market trends concerning Chinese and 
Western Internet Firms in China  
These reports were mainly used to 
validate the chronology of major 
events and provide written accounts 
of key developments in the case 
studies.   
 
 
Web portals  
A range of Chinese web portals are regularly 
monitored, for example, TouTiao.com, Shujuju.cn, 
China Big Data Industrial Observation 
(Cbdio.com), and links to relevant reports, news 
and commentaries via personal Wechat contacts 
and their Moments.  
These portals are mainly used to generate 
lead to new research reports, news release 
and relevant new initiatives by Chinese and 
Western internet firms, major changes in 
regulations and policies in China, and on-
going development of the digital economy, 
infrastructure and services 
Mainly provide background 
information and identify links to 
current and historical developments 
in China on a regular basis.  Also 
links to major news and research 
reports in relevant areas.  
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TABLE 4: THE INSIDE VIEW - FINDINGS FROM THE FIRST PHASE INTERVIEWS 
FIRST ORDER CATEGORIES SECOND LEVEL THEMES AGGREGATE DIMENSIONS 
Global business model uncompetitive in China  
 
Imposing global business model in 
China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conceding multiple strategic 
advantages to Chinese competitors   
Global business model not adapted for Chinese market 
Imposing global business model on Chinese acquisitions 
Products and services aimed at middle class users in first tier cities only 
Reluctance to diversify with narrow range of products and services 
Rigid adherence to group pricing strategy  
Limited and narrow sources of revenues   
Failing to compete with more aggressive Chinese competitors  
 
Failing to cope with extreme 
competition 
Failing to respond quickly to extremely intensive competition  
Rigid adherence to western competitive strategies and tactics in China 
Failing to capitalise on group technological advantages in competition 
Unable to compete with very large numbers of local competitors 
Unable to cope with more determined competitors  
Incompatible and poorly aligned local partners in China  
 
 
Problems with business partners and 
local acquisitions  
Failing to capitalise on the market dominance of local acquisitions 
Failing to manage relations with local partners 
Failing to acquire local market leaders in China 
Failing to utilise proven expertise and relations (Guanxi) of local partners 
Focusing only on formal business partnerships through strategic alliance, 
merger and acquisition 
Inability to develop non-transactional relations with supporting companies 
and user communities 
Technological platform not designed for China‟s internet environment  
Imposing global technological platform 
in China 
 
 
 
 
 
Operationally underperform Chinese 
Competitors 
 
 
 
 
Rigid adherence to global technological platform and reluctant to adapt 
Imposing global technological platform on new acquisitions in China 
Products and services not designed or adapted for Chinese consumers 
Organisational structure too rigid for rapidly changing consumer behaviours  
 
 
 
Centralised organisational structures and 
slow decision making   
 
 
 
 
Local management lacked sufficient autonomy 
Decision making by head office too slow for China 
Decisions by head office inappropriate for China 
Inability to respond quickly to local competitors 
Relying on expatriates to manage Chinese operations 
Reluctance to empower local talents to manage operations in China 
Imposing international business practices that are ineffective in China 
Slow response to local competition and changing customer demands 
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Poor understanding of Chinese culture and user preferences  
 
 
 
Poor understanding of Chinese market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failing to Understand and Respond 
to the Chinese Business 
Environment 
Poor understanding of user behaviours in China 
Poor understanding of user segments in China 
Failing to appreciate market differences between China and the West 
Failing to understand diversity in user demographics, expectations and 
preferences across different cities and regions  
Failing to appreciate geographical differences in different parts of China 
Web design, products and services and brand promotion targeted at first tier 
cities only – ignoring the rest of China 
Poor understanding of the internet environment in China  
 
Failing to adapt for China‟s 
Infrastructures and support services 
Failing to adapt for the uneven development of telecommunications 
infrastructure and internet accessibility and speed in different regions 
Failing to appreciate the limitations of banking systems in China 
Limitations of transportation infrastructure and logistics services in China 
Online security and user protection concerns due to inadequate regulations 
Inadequate third party supporting services in China 
Weak protection of IP rights  
 
 
Failing to manage regulatory 
environment and government relations  
Inability to manage or maintain complex relations with Chinese governments 
and their different departments 
Inconsistent and rapidly changing regulations both nationally and locally 
Unwilling to cooperate with Chinese government 
Regulations interpreted and implemented differently and inconsistently across 
cities and regions 
Regulations and government relations are viewed negatively rather than as 
potential opportunities  
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TABLE 5: MAIN FINDINGS FROM FIRST PHASE INTERVIEWS 
Key themes Main issues Typical quotations Why more crucial for 
WIFs than others 
Firms 
 
 
Imposing global 
business model in 
China  
 Uncompetitive against 
CIFs 
 Fewer sources of 
revenues than CIFs 
 Narrower range of 
services than CIFs  
 Ineffective for trust 
building 
„We were pretty confident at the beginning—it worked well 
everywhere else, right? But things were falling apart—and it 
was fast. The competition level we faced in China was much 
stronger than we had in any other countries, and this created 
many uncertainties and challenges on our performance‟ 
[Former eBay executive] 
 Need for multiple 
sources of revenues 
 Less transactional and 
more complex 
relations with users 
 Users at centre of 
both value creation 
and consumption  
eBay 
Google 
Amazon 
Groupon 
 
 
 
Failing to cope with 
extreme competition 
 Very large number of 
competitors 
 Local competitor stronger 
and more determined  
 More CIFs fail than WIFs 
but some CIFs survive  
 More competitive than 
any other markets 
„We were hit by a double whammy in China. One is the 
business environment in general. We definitely underestimated 
the challenges. Another one is the local competition level. The 
local firms are real contenders. We might have some 
advantages, but things change so fast and you need to be fast to 
respond to this competition. The ability to retaliate is extremely 
important, but we do not have sufficient autonomy to do so.‟ 
[Amazon Executive]  
 Low technological 
entry barriers 
 Winner takes most 
mentality and market 
structure 
 Exclusive market 
focus on China by 
local competitors  
Yahoo 
eBay 
Groupon  
Uber 
 
 
 
Problems with business 
partners and local 
acquisitions 
 Failing to capitalising on 
Chinese partners and 
local acquisitions 
 Imposing group 
management style on 
local acquisitions  
When Yahoo took over 3721.com, we were all very optimistic.  
However, Zhou Hongyu (founder of 3721.com) felt that the 
original Yahoo employees were overpaid and lazy; and 
3721.com employees felt alienated because Yahoo imposed its 
reporting and management style on them.  It was toxic. 
[Former Yahoo Executive]  
 Extreme volatility 
demands cultural 
sensitivity & deep 
local knowledge  
 Rapid changes 
amplify limitations of 
western management 
styles 
Yahoo 
eBay 
Groupon 
 
 
 
 
Imposing global 
technological platform 
on operations in China 
 Platforms not purpose-
designed for the Chinese 
market 
 Platforms not attuned for 
local infrastructure and 
user behaviours  
„At that time, when Chinese users browsed the internet they 
would open up six or seven windows, moving from one window 
to the next. There would often be pop-up windows when 
clicking from one story to the next. The reason for this was 
because the internet speed was very slow and unreliable.  By 
opening up multiple windows, users could read one page while 
waiting for the others to download.  As a result, the design of 
 Cultural sensitivity 
crucial to success 
 Adapting platform 
designed for other 
markets can‟t compete 
with purpose build 
platform 
Yahoo 
eBay 
Google 
Amazon 
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all Chinese web portals was usually several screens long, with 
numerous links cramped onto the page.  In contrast, Yahoo 
insisted on maintaining the simplicity and clean global design 
of its web portal in China, which worked well in the USA but it 
was not suited for the market conditions and consumer 
behaviours in China.‟  [Former Yahoo Executive] 
 Flaws in platform 
leaves room for 
competitors to launch 
better platforms in a 
very large market 
 
 
Centralised 
organisational 
structures and slow 
decision making 
 Decision making too slow 
for rapidly changing 
environment 
 Head office and expats 
lacked local knowledge 
for strategic & 
operational decision 
making 
 Lack of autonomy 
alienated local talents  
„Like most other global firms that have built their technological 
platforms or products for the global market, Yahoo tried to 
standardise its web portal platform for all markets.  Under 
normal circumstances there‟s nothing wrong with such an 
approach, but in the Internet market in China, the ability to 
adapt and to customise according to the needs of the market is 
critically important, because consumer preferences are 
evolving extremely rapidly.  When Yahoo China‟s local 
management has limited say in how the product can be adapted 
to local needs, our fate is sealed.‟ [Former Yahoo executive]     
 Ultra volatility & 
rapid change call for 
local autonomy and 
fast decision making  
 Cultural and political 
sensitivity critical for 
internet services  
 Alienating local 
talents detrimental to 
internet firms 
Yahoo 
eBay 
Google 
Amazon 
Groupon 
 
 
 
Poor understanding of 
Chinese market 
 Market segments very 
different from the West  
 What works in the West 
might not work in China 
 Failing to recognise 
market differences 
between urban and rural 
areas and between 
different Provinces 
„Chinese users were not comfortable with completing 
transactions online during that time. There were too many 
“what if?” uncertainties: What if the seller is a scam? What if 
product quality is poor? In the US, we had a well-established 
system to tackle these problems, but here, the relevant 
financial, logistics services and regulations are rather limited. 
And they (Headquarters) completely ignored these issues that 
have fundamental impacts on our customer experience‟ 
[Former eBay Eachnet Executive] 
 Detrimental to 
success in culturally 
sensitive markets  
 Chinese internet 
market materially 
different from the 
West 
Yahoo 
eBay 
Google 
 
 
 
Failing to manage 
regulatory 
environment, 
government relations 
and infrastructure 
 Competitors better 
adapted for local 
infrastructure and support 
services 
 Competitors more skilled 
at interpreting and 
managing regulations and 
governmental relations   
„Government censorship did not stop us succeeding in 
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia or Africa, why should it stop us 
succeeding in China?  It is a convenient excuse to „save face‟. 
The real reason for our exit from China was because we failed 
commercially. We could not compete with Baidu.‟ [Former 
Google Executive]. 
„People always immediately associated China with IP rights 
and censorship, which is rather simplistic. What about culture, 
the supporting mechanism and the level of competition? 
Chinese customers have their own preferences when it comes to 
their online activities. Two things are important here: what you 
can deliver and how you deliver it. We were not good at either 
of them in China.‟ [Former Yahoo Executive] 
 Essential for survival 
in politically and 
culturally sensitive 
markets  
 Internet business 
relies on local 
infrastructure and 
support services for 
survival  
 Internet market in 
China materially 
different from the 
West 
Google 
Amazon 
eBay 
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TABLE 6: THE OUTSIDE VIEW - FINDINGS FROM THE SECOND PHASE INTERVIEWS 
FIRST ORDER CATEGORIES SECOND LEVEL THEMES AGGREGATE DIMENSIONS 
„Huge crowd strategy‟ by competitors – too many competitors to beat   
 
Very large number of competitors in 
China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failing to Understand and Respond 
to the Chinese Business 
Environment 
 
 
„Baili Tiaoyi‟ (one in a hundred) versus „Wanli Tiaoyi‟ (one in ten thousands) 
Difficulties to dominate and maintain dominance in a massive market  
Lack of patience and overly optimistic about ability to dominate the massive 
Chinese internet market within a very short period  
Underestimate the determination and strength of Chinese competitors – 
whoever blinks first loses  
 
 
 
 
 
Chinese competitors are more aggressive 
and more determined  
Overly pessimistic after initial setbacks  
Admitting defeat and withdraw from China too quickly after setbacks  
Business interests in many markets versus exclusive focus on Chinese market 
Failure to acquire market leaders in China 
Multiple decisions made and implemented on the same day by Chinese 
internet firms versus slow decision making in western internet firms 
Better to be hated by being aggressive and taking risks in China than to be 
forgotten or ignored by playing safe 
Target-driven versus process-driven in weak regulatory environment - 
achieving targets by all legally allowed means with ‟no holds barred‟ 
Short lead time to establish competitive advantages in digital business  
 
New digital rules of the game  
Lack of sustainable advantages in core technologies and advanced knowhow  
Importance of cultural sensitivity in creating superior user experiences in 
digital business  
Sources of value added in digital business compared with other sectors favour 
local firms – limited advantages and equal starting point  
The Art of War inspired winning business strategies under different 
circumstances ingrained in Chinese history and culture 
 
 
 
Failures by strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
Conceding Multiple Advantages in 
Strategy Making and 
Communication to Chinese 
Competitors  
The Thirty Six Stratagem inspired winning competitive strategies and tactics 
for different situations embedded in everyday language 
Mao‟s military strategies and tactics enabled effective strategy making and 
communication when fighting stronger competitors 
Underestimate Chinese competitors and failure to recognise the drive, 
ambition, work ethic, determination and ambition of Chinese entrepreneurs 
Imitate and then fine-tune for China as an effective innovation strategy by 
Chinese internet firms 
 
 
 
 
Ineffective innovation strategy  
Failing to recognise and compete with Chinese internet firms on new products 
and services designed for Chinese users and customers 
Result-driven (rather than process-oriented) innovation strategies by Chinese 
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internet firms 
Willingness by Chinese entrepreneurs to take risks in innovation  
Long term plans ineffective in volatile internet market compared with „quick 
fire‟ and „low hanging fruit‟ innovation strategy 
Lack of local autonomy to adapt products, web designs and marketing 
approaches for Chinese market or introduce new services 
 
 
 
Lack of local autonomy and slow 
decision making  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Underperforming Chinese 
Competitors in Operation and 
Execution  
Expatriates lacked cultural sensitivity to manage operations and relations  
Foreign executives fail to integrate into important social and business circles  
Important decisions made by people in the head office in the West with 
limited understanding of Chinese market and culture  
Centralised organisational structure and differences in time zones hindered 
communications resulting in slow decision making in western internet firms  
Senior Management from HongKong/Taiwan and employees from Shanghai 
and Beijing have limited understanding of lives in other parts of China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failing to be embedded in local market 
„Quick and dirty‟ product development (good enough) more effective than 
superior user experience and exceeding user expectations in China  
Crowded website design with rich content corresponds to bustling, 
prosperous, exciting and lively; versus simple, clean, elegant design implies 
desolate, depression, dull and lifeless (cultural differences) 
Inherent competitive advantages of the local internet firms - „The mighty 
dragon is no match for the native serpent‟ (强龙难压地头蛇)  
„Sharks are only powerful in the ocean, but they can‟t beat the Chinese 
Alligators in the Yangtze River‟ (Quoting Alibaba‟s Jack Ma on eBay) 
Branding and marketing efforts focusing on white collar middle class 
customers at huge costs versus welcoming all customers at low /no costs 
Aggressive, result-driven marketing tactics (e.g. annoying pop-ups) versus 
indirect brand building with limited direct short term results 
Ineffective communications by email and instant messaging in English versus 
face to face meetings, entertaining clients, and telephone calls in Chinese  
Western educated employees with similar ideas and styles versus employees 
from diverse backgrounds with different ideas and approaches  
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TABLE 7: MAIN FINDINGS FROM THE SECOND PHASE INTERVIEWS 
Key Themes Main Issues Typical quotations Why more crucial for WIFs  Firms 
 
 
Losing by Numbers: 
One in a Hundred 
against One in a 
Million 
 Competition is 
relative  
 Very large number of 
local competitors  
 
"The internet market in China is the most complicated and 
competitive in the world. The marketing and communication of 
international firms are often ineffective and too mild to reach 
customers." [Senior Business Consultant] 
„The bloodiest battles today are fought amongst Chinese 
internet firms themselves as they enter the market niches of 
each other and aggressively expand into new areas, not 
between western and Chinese internet firms‟.  [Tech 
Entrepreneur] 
 Low entry barriers result in 
very large number of local 
competitors  
 Weak, complex and 
unpredictable regulatory 
environment leads to extreme 
competition  
Groupon 
Yahoo 
eBay 
Amazon 
 
Failure by 
Strategies: From 
‘The Art of War’ to 
‘The Thirty Six 
Stratagems’ 
 Western strategies 
not aligned with 
Chinese history and 
culture  
 Strategy making and 
communication by 
WIFs less effective 
than CIFs 
„Withdraw when the enemies advance, advance when they 
retreat; harass when they rest, and fight when they are 
exhausted‟  
„First encircle cities from rural areas, and eventually take 
control of the cities and the whole country‟ [People Quoting 
Jack Ma of Alibaba quoting Chairman Mao] 
 Fundamental differences 
between internet firms and 
other industries  
 What worked in the west 
might not work in China  
 WIFs have no precedents to 
draw on in internet services 
eBay 
Amazon 
Google 
Groupon 
Whoever Blinks 
First Loses: Beaten 
By More 
Determined 
Competitors 
 More determined 
competitors  
 CIFs totally 
committed to 
Chinese market  
„In circumstances like these—where the Chinese company has 
a head start, total domestic focus, powerful backers, and 
virtually limitless cash to draw on —I think the chances of the 
foreign company winning are virtually nil, even if it does 
everything right.‟ [Senior Business Consultant] 
 More determined competitors 
 CIFs totally focused on 
Chinese market 
Uber 
Google 
eBay 
Groupon 
Yahoo 
 
Digital Rules: 
Differences between 
Internet and 
Traditional 
Businesses 
 
 Short life cycle  
 Low entry barrier 
 Need for multiple 
sources of revenues  
“Baidu regards its customers, the businesses that advertise on 
its platform, as „fish‟; while the individual users of its platform 
as „water‟.  There can‟t be fish without water, which is 
particularly important for internet firms.  As a result the key to 
success for internet firms is superior „user experience‟, rather 
than „customer satisfaction‟ as in traditional industries. User 
experience is far more difficult to get right than customer 
satisfaction, which depends on deep understanding of culture.” 
[Senior Business Executive] 
 Strategic and operational 
challenges due to differences 
between internet firms and 
other sectors 
 WIFs have few technological 
advantages but many 
disadvantages 
Google 
Amazon 
eBay 
Yahoo 
Groupon 
Uber 
Failing to Be 
Embedded in the 
Local Market  
 
 Failure to understand 
local market 
 Failure to attract and 
empower local talents 
 Failure to adopt 
For western internet firms in China, it all boils down to 
understanding other people‟s ways of thinking and doing 
things. They have to understand local governments, their 
employees, business partners, users and clients. Looking back, 
the western internet giants that failed were simply out of tune 
 Focusing on middle class 
market and ignore other user 
segments 
 Internet business has little 
value if it fails to attract and 
Google 
eBay 
Groupon 
Yahoo 
Amazon 
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management styles 
suitable for China  
with the Chinese market. They didn‟t clearly see the 
importance of understanding Chinese culture; they talked to 
the wrong people in the wrong ways about the wrong things. 
[Senior Business Consultant]  
retain users 
 
Innovating by 
Experimenting 
 No precedents to 
draw on  
 Slow to innovate in 
technologies and 
services  
„Crossing the river by touching the rocks under water‟. [This 
Quote from Deng Xiaoping was used on numerous occasions]   
„Innovation in China means adaptation and fine tuning, and 
their[WIFs]  aggressive strategy would never work in China‟  
[Senior Business Executive] 
 CIFs can rapidly introduce 
and fine-tune a large number 
of innovations at low costs 
 User centred innovations 
through continuous user 
engagement  
Groupon 
Amazon 
Yahoo 
Google 
eBay 
Uber 
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TABLE 8: SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
 
 The Inside View (First Phase) The Outside View (Second Phase) 
 
Failing to Understand and 
Respond to the Chinese 
Business Environment 
 Poor understanding of Chinese market  
 Failing to adapt for China‟s regulatory 
environment, government relations and 
Infrastructures 
 Large number of competitors  
 Aggressive and determined local competitors 
 Fundamental differences between internet 
services and other industries 
Conceding multiple 
strategic advantages to 
Chinese competitors   
 Imposing global business model in China 
 Failing to cope with extreme competition 
 Problems with business partners and local 
acquisitions 
 Failure in strategy making and communications  
 Ineffective innovation strategies 
Underperforming Chinese 
Competitors in Operation 
and Execution 
 Imposing global technological platform in China  
 Centralised organisational structures and slow 
decision making  
 Failing to be embedded in China 
Prevailing Narratives for 
the Failure of all WIFs in 
China 
 Lack of Strategic Determination and Patience in 
China 
 Failing to Acclimatise to China‟s Business 
Environment 
Why have All WIFs Failed 
in China?  
The „Perfect Storm‟:  
Few genuine competitive advantages and underperforming local competitors in nearly every aspect 
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